The Study of Conspiracy Theories
Joseph E. Uscinski
University of Miami
Abstract
The study of conspiracy theories has undergone a drastic transformation in the last
decade. While early scholarly treatments relied on historical cases and cultural
analyses, more recent works focus on the individuals who subscribe either to specific conspiracy beliefs or to more generalized conspiratorial thinking. This shift in
focus presents scholars with an opportunity to learn more about how and why conspiracy theories gain followers. But also, this new focus presents dangers which
have yet to be fully considered by the psychologists, social-psychologists, and political scientists spearheading the research. In this essay, I highlight the potential
benefits and pitfalls of the current scholarly agenda.
Keywords: Conspiracy Theories, Conspiracy, Paranoid Style, Public Opinion
The study of conspiracy theories and the people who believe them largely began
with Richard Hofstadter’s look into the “paranoid style” in the 1950s and 1960s
(Hofstadter 1964). In the decades that followed, the study of conspiracy theories
remained largely a domain of historians (Davis 1972, Gribbin 1974, Hogue 1976,
Wood 1982). The 1990s saw a shift towards cultural critiques (Knight 1997, 1999,
Melley 2000, Markley 1997), and the turn towards the new century ushered in a
flurry of work from philosophers and epistemologists (Basham 2003, Clarke 2002,
Coady 2003, Dentith 2014, Heins 2007, Keeley 1999, 2003, Pigden 1995, Raikka
2009). During this time, a few social scientists studied conspiracy theories
(McHoskey 1995, McClosky and Chong 1985, Goertzel 1994, McCauley and
Jacques 1979), but these studies tended to be one-off treatments unconnected to
a broader research trajectory. Both the historians and cultural scholars treated
conspiracy theories in a qualitative way, looking at historical episodes and broad
trends. Scholars made little effort to better understand—at the induvial level—
what factors drove people to believe in conspiracy theories, or conversely, what
factors could “cure” people of their unwarranted conspiracy beliefs. This abruptly
changed in 2008.
As the 1990s came to a close and the twenty-first century began, several
events became the subject of much high-profile conspiracy theorizing. In the
United Kingdom, the death of Princess Diana and the 7/7 attacks; in the United
States, the contested election of George W. Bush, the 9/11 attacks, the global war
2 Joseph E. Uscinski
on terror, and the election of Barack Obama. The conspiracy theories that became
attached to the aforementioned events appear to have motivated social scientists
to invest a large amount of resources into studying conspiratorial theories at the
individual level. I mention the UK and US specifically because the growing body
of scholarship addressing conspiracy theories has largely, though not exclusively,
emanated from British and American scholars.
Works by psychologists, social-psychologists, and political scientists have examined why people believe in conspiracy theories about Princess Diana’s death
(Wood, Douglas and Sutton 2012), the 7/7 Tube bombings (Wood and Finlay
2008), the 9/11 attacks (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2010), and
Barack Obama’s sudden rise to power (Pasek et al. 2014). Such works have motivated a larger number of social scientists to enter the field and to study beliefs in
a wider range of conspiracy theories, as well as the behaviors that stem from such
beliefs (Jolley and Douglas 2014, van der Linden 2015).
While most of the authors working on the topic do not directly refer to the
conspiracy theories they study as pathologies, much of the work could be read
that way. Many scholars refer to conspiracy theories as “myths,” “false beliefs,”
“misinformation,” and “rumors” (i.e., Berinsky 2015, Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel
2013, Lewandowsky et al. 2012). This should come as no surprise, the term, “conspiracy theory” and its variants are loaded terms. Conspiracy theories and the
people who espouse them are often considered irrational (Husting and Orr 2007,
Coady 2006).
The current research agenda appears to be most interested in learning how
to dissuade individuals of their conspiracy theories (Bode and Vraga 2015,
Lewandowsky et al. 2012, Nyhan and Reifler 2010, Nyhan et al. 2013, Thorson
2015, Berinsky 2015). As a scholarly pursuit, it is certainly worthwhile to better
understand why people hold certain opinions and what information might change
those opinions. As a scholar of public opinion, I wholeheartedly applaud this
work. As a practical matter, there are certainly times when we need to convince
people of truth, and having the tools to do so can save lives. For example, if a
category 5 hurricane was approaching, the government would require the tools
necessary to convince naysayers to evacuate. Lives are at stake.
However, in discovering the tools for ridding people of conspiracy theories,
social scientists are inadvertently and unintentionally providing the powerful with
an increased ability to quash dissent. Social scientists often view conspiracy theories as misperceptions or incorrect beliefs; but they are much more than this.
Conspiracy theories are tools for dissent used by the weak to balance against
power (Uscinski and Parent 2014). To rid people of their conspiracy theories is to
therefore rid them of a form of political dissent.
The purpose of this article is to assess both the promise and perils of the current scholarly trajectory and to urge social scientists to exercise great care when
studying conspiracy theories. I begin first with a few definitions. Then I argue that
conspiracy theories should be treated with skepticism but not as wrong or false
per se. This is because conspiracy theories have unique epistemological properties
which shield them from falsification. I then argue that conspiracy theories are
necessary to the healthy functioning of society because they help balance against
concentrations of power. This article then moves to highlight both the advances
made by social scientists in recent years and the dangers that those advances pose.
The Study of Conspiracy Theories 3
I conclude that in developing effective methods for countering conspiracy theories, social scientists have unwittingly provided powerful interests with tools
which can increase their power.